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INTRODUCTION
Most non-academics tend to take as a given that people can freely make 
decisions and choices when there are alternatives and absence of ex-
ternal constraints. A case for consciousness causing certain behaviors 
has been made by Pockett, Banks, and Gallagher (2009). Nonetheless, 
there is a growing body of scientists and philosophers, many of whom 
are  acknowledged  as  scholars  of  the  first  rank  who  acknowledge 
consciousness as a distinct mental state, yet conclude that free will 
is  an  illusion,  a  trick  played  on  us  by  the  brain.  This  view  dates 
back for hundreds of years, but in our time the debate has intensi-
fied,  in  large  part  because  of  what  I  think  is  misinterpreted  re-
search.
The purpose of this review is to incorporate the findings of recent 
research into the evolving understanding of the enduring scientific 
and philosophical controversy over whether humans have free will. 
This review identifies 12 categories of concerns that are, in the author’s 
view, not adequately considered by those who argue that free will is 
an illusion. This review also provides some suggestions for improving 
the design of future experiments.
Analysis of the controversy requires clear definitions of a few terms, 
which unfortunately are often used colloquially with poor precision. 
To a degree, such problems are inevitable. Nonetheless, operational 
definitions are helpful. Free will could be defined in various ways. Will 
is herein operationally defined here by such synonyms as intent, choice, 
or decision, and it can be accomplished consciously or subconsciously. 
Free implies a conscious causation in which an intent, choice, or deci-
sion is made among alternatives that are more or less possible of ac-
complishment and are not constrained by either external or internal   
imperatives for the embodied brain.
It seems important to emphasize that not all conscious actions 
are freely willed. One is often consciously aware of one‘s actions that 
may have been subconsciously generated, as in observing one’s own 
knee-jerk reflex. So one task of free-will research is to design tests 
that  distinguish  conscious  awareness  from  conscious  choice  (free 
will).
Defining consciousness is much more problematic. Pacherie (2009) 
suggests there are two ways to think about consciousness: The first 
idea is that consciousness is a state where one is conscious (aware?) 
of an object, property, or state of affairs. This strikes me as a circular 
definition, which can also be found in many dictionary definitions. 
The second aspect of consciousness is that it is a state where one “has 
a representation of that state as a specific attitude toward a certain 
object, property, or situation” (p. 160). It seems to me that this is 
simply saying that consciousness is a state in which you are aware that
you are aware. This is perhaps easiest to comprehend if conscious-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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ness is regarded as a neurophysiological avatar, generated as a neural 
representation  of  self,  aware  of  events  in  the  environment  in  the 
context of itself. Such an avatar could be a self-aware active agent of 
the embodied brain, an argument that I pursue in another manu-
script.
The zOmbIe aRgUmeNT
Those who argue against free will arrive at their counter-intuitive con-
clusion from research that does seem to challenge the traditional com-
mon-sense view of free will. Zombian is used as a semantic shorthand 
to describe those who subscribe to some form of Thomas Huxley’s view 
that humans are “conscious automata” whose brains cause behavior 
without conscious intent. Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein had also 
voiced similar zombian points of view. 
Some very prominent modern scholars have expressed sympathy 
for the zombian view of human existence: Daniel Dennett, Patricia 
Churchland,  Marc  Jeannerod,  Michael  Gazzaniga,  Hakwan  Lau, 
Benjamin Libet, Henrik Walter, and Daniel Wegner. 
The zombian idea has been tested in several formal studies that 
attempt to show that intentions are generated subconsciously – that 
is, free will is considered an illusion. Consciousness can only pro-
duce awareness of intentions; it can’t cause anything. Some zombians 
concede that consciousness can veto certain subconscious decisions. 
A role for conscious choice in programming the subconscious is sel-
dom considered in these debates. 
People with brain injuries provided the first arguments against 
free will. For example, people with injuries that caused amnesia were 
studied by British psychologists, Elizabeth Warrington and Lawrence 
Weiskrantz (1968). They showed a series of words to the amnesics, who 
could not remember the words. Then the patients were shown the first 
three letters of each word and asked to complete the letters to make 
a word, any word. Amazingly, they consistently conjured a word that 
was exactly the same as the one they had just seen and forgotten. In 
other words, the words were memorized in the subconscious mind but 
not the conscious mind. But this could just indicate a memory recall 
problem. What has this got to do with intentions?
 The zombian argument may have begun catching on with the book 
by Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness and the Breakdown of the 
Bicameral Mind (1976). Jaynes gave many logical arguments that con-
sciousness is not necessary for thinking and that most human mental 
work is done subconsciously, only becoming realized consciously after 
the fact. Jaynes concluded that consciousness is used only to prepare 
for thought and to perceive and analyze the end result of thinking. 
Experimental evidence was not provided.
Subsequent zombian theorists argue that decisions are made sub-
consciously and the conscious mind lays claim to them as its own. This 
position holds that the brain is an automaton that creates its own rules 
and makes sure that we live by them. The brain is in charge of itself. 
Zombian theorists argue that human personality and behavior are 
predetermined and predictable, controlled by genetics and by how 
the brain has been programmed by the social and physical environ-
ment. There is no recognition that conscious mind can program the 
subconscious, as in learning to play the piano or riding a bicycle, for 
example. 
Zombians cite the existence of compulsions and addictions as ex-
amples where conscious awareness fails to control the brain. The con-
scious mind knows when we have bad behaviors but can’t do anything 
about it. Our excuse is that we are addicted, have a brain disorder, or 
have been programmed by bad events beyond our control. The same 
kind of logic is used to explain character or personality flaws. We say, 
for example, “He can’t help it. That’s just the way he is.” Or “She really 
doesn’t mean to be that way.” Or “I can’t believe he did that. He is such 
a good boy.”
A more complete philosophical argument is provided by Henrik 
Walter (2001). He says our standard theory of mind is wrong, a mere 
convenience  that  satisfies  our  expectations  about  what  people  do. 
Walter says that criminals cannot be held responsible for their crimes. 
He argues that the correct notion is that we are automatons, albeit ones 
that are aware of what we are automatically doing. I think Walter is 
saying that conscious mind is only partly aware of the choices made by 
the subconscious. Conscious mind can only “look in” on what the real 
mind is doing. At best, a common view is that conscious mind can only 
monitor and perhaps veto choices made subconsciously. A more liberal 
elaboration is that free will operates “to ensure the continuity of sub-
jective experience across actions which are – of necessity – executed 
automatically” (Jeannerod, 2009, p. 37).
A complete defense of the zombian school of thought is in the book 
by Daniel Wegner (2002). Leading thinkers, such as the philosopher, 
Patricia Churchland (2002), and the neuroscientist, Michael Gazzaniga 
(1998), recognize the nihilistic nature of the zombian conclusion but 
are resigned to a position of “it must be so.”
The most recent book perpetuates the zombian argument at least 
for many short-term intentions and asserts that the question remains 
open for all other intentions (Pockett et al., 2009). 
Philosophers seem to polarize around two points of view: People 
lack free will but sometimes may have it (compatibilism) or human 
thoughts are beyond personal control and incompatible with free will 
(incompatibilist, i.e., “zombian”). 
Some kind of logical reconciliation seems needed, and this is what 
gives urgency to the compromise of compatibilism. Most contempo-
rary philosophers seem to hold the compatibilist view, namely that hu-
man beliefs and actions arise from a subconscious zombie-like mind, 
but it is wrong to assert that humans have no element of free will. Since 
free will is necessary for moral responsibility, one either has to accept 
free will or reject the notion that humans are responsible for what they 
believe and do. 
In modern times, the free-will conundrum has been exacerbated 
by neuroscientific evidence that seems to conflict with the notion that 
people are responsible for their beliefs and actions. The accumulation 
of experimental evidence began with the simple experiment performed 
and  elaborated  in  the  1980s  by  University  of  California  scientist, 
Benjamin Libet. Thus, this present analysis will focus on the proto-
typical Libet experiment and those of others that followed in order toAdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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identify  its  strengths  and  weaknesses  concerning  the  issue  of  free 
will.
I wish to focus on recent neuroscience that has aroused the pas-
sions  of  scholars  and  provided  evidence  that  confuses  the  issues. 
Hopefully, I can provide some comfort to those neuroscientists who 
feel intimidated by philosophical sophistry into believing their data 
supports determinism at the expense of free will, when they might have 
thought their experiments were simple and easily interpreted. Here, 
I argue that zombian interpretations are based on flimsy evidence and 
specious arguments. 
a New CRITIqUe Of  zOmbIaN                
ReseaRCh
My critique will focus on three methodological arguments: (a) timing 
of when a free will event occurred is not accurately identified by intro-
spection, which has been the dominant paradigm in zombian research, 
(b) free-will events are not readily captured by many of the kinds of 
tasks and procedures that have been used in zombian research, and 
(c) neurophysiological measures have been inadequate.
Two main lines of research provide the scientific underpinnings for 
modern zombianism. One is the paradigm developed by Wegner in 
the 1990s in which subjects were asked to move a cursor randomly 
around a computer screen and stop the cursor every 30 s or so over an 
object depicted on the screen (see e.g., Wegner, 2002). After each stop, 
the subject introspectively rated their intentionality in terms of how 
sure they were that they made a conscious decision to stop the cur-
sor or whether the experimenter had made the manipulation behind 
the scenes. Subjects were quite bad in making such estimations. They 
were correct only 56% of the time that they had actually caused all of 
the stops. Wegner developed a later approach by having subjects view 
other people’s gloved hands located in the position where their own 
hands would be. As the gloved hands performed actions, subjects were 
asked to rate the extent to which they had controlled the movements. 
Again, subjects performed poorly in such estimates. 
Wegner  showed  that  the  conscious  sense  of  voluntary  control 
increased when conscious prior thoughts corresponded to observed 
actions. From this, Wegner inferred that free will was retrospectively 
inferred. However, such results do not seem to provide unequivocal 
evidence against free will. Is it not possible that, regardless of accu-
racy, subjects had a pre-existing free will decision to stop the cursor 
whenever they wanted to? Is it not possible that their inaccuracies in 
assessing voluntary control arise from incomplete information and 
the inherent uncertainties in the task? 
Just  as  the  zombian  conclusion  of  Warrington  and  Weiskrantz 
(1968) is suspect because their experiment measures memory recall 
more than conscious intent, Wegner’s conclusions are not compelling, 
because his experimental designs seems to test more than free will.  My 
objection to the design is that one cannot conclude unequivocally that 
the intent is either conscious or subconscious, and that the major un-
controlled variable is the level of reliability of the subjects’ awareness of 
their conscious intent. Tim Bayne (2009) has written a more exhaustive 
criticism of Wegner’s zombianism based on the extreme complexity of 
the experience of conscious will.  
The second line of research providing the scientific underpinnings 
for modern zombianism is the Libet Experiments. Libet (1985) moni-
tored a “voluntary” finger movement while at the same time recording 
brain waves from the scalp overlying the part of the brain cortex that 
issues movement commands to the fingers. Participants were asked to 
make a spontaneous finger movement, at a time of their choice, while 
watching an electronic spot moving around a clock face. Subjects were 
to note the time on the clock at the instant that they decided to move 
the finger. When subjects consciously decided to make a movement, 
they reported the time of the decision from watching the modified 
clock. As expected, subjects thought that they had decided to move 
about a half second before actual movement, which is consistent with 
the idea that they willed the movement to occur.  
But was that willed action “free?” The startling finding was that 
a major change in the EEG signal from motor cortex was observed 
about 350 ms before the subjects claimed that they willed the com-
mand to move. This EEG signal, discovered many years ago by others 
and dubbed “readiness potential,” was chosen by Libet to index the mo-
ment of decision. One interpretation of such a result, is that the decision 
was made unconsciously and consciousness is not part of the cause. 
Accepting that premise, one is forced to conclude that one does not 
“will” such movement, but merely retrospectively confirms that there 
was a willed action which must have been developed subconsciously. 
The brain just subconsciously decides to move and lets the conscious 
mind know what it has decided. The disturbing corollary is that one 
does not freely “choose” to do anything. The brain is just driven by 
external and internal forces to direct behavior, and one’s consciousness 
is only around to know about it (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1.
the concept of free will as an illusion. subconscious mind is 
said  to  create  behavior  and  belatedly  lets  conscious  mind 
aware of what has already been done. t. h. huxley called con-
scious will to act as a mere “symbol” of the processes that ge-
nerate action.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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The Libet-type study relies on introspection, and the consensus 
of investigators subsequently using similar paradigms has been that 
participants were correctly aware of the time at which they thought 
they made the decision. The insufficiently addressed problem is the 
reliability of both introspection and accuracy of timing awareness.
Libet  claims  that  humans  cannot  consciously  initiate  a  choice, 
because  the  motor  cortex  “readiness  potential”  begins  to  develop 
400 ms before a subject is consciously aware of an intent to act. But, 
since awareness of intention occurs 150 ms before actual movement, 
it is possible that one can freely choose to veto or inhibit an act that is 
triggered by subconscious command. He even demonstrated that sub-
jects could veto their readiness potentials. Libet also took great care to 
rule out a role for misperceived timing, but I will argue later that such 
introspection cannot be reliable.
The Libet-type study also relies on a limited set of neurophysiologi-
cal data. The premise is that monitoring a small piece of brain, such 
as the motor cortex, can serve as the indicator for conscious decision. 
Surely, there must be electrical indicators of conscious decision-making 
somewhere else in the brain, and it may have preceded development of 
the readiness potential. More recent investigators have indeed docu-
mented increased brain activity prior to the increased motor cortex 
activity, and these include areas not normally associated with move-
ment (see below). Nobody knows where in the brain the conscious self 
is, much less where intentions are first initiated.
  Another problem: The part of the cortex that was monitored, the 
motor cortex, only began its increased activity before the self reported 
intent to move. Few analysts admit how little we really know about 
what is signaled by this “readiness potential.” This will be explored in 
some depth later in this paper.  
Follow-up studies
In a follow-up to the Libet experiment, human brain scans were taken 
as subjects were asked to report when they first felt the urge or in-
tention to move (Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2004). The brain scan 
images showed three small cortical regions of activation when the 
subjects attended to the urge to move prior to the actual movement 
itself, about 0.25 s before the actual movement, which is consistent with 
Libet’s results. But conscious intention was associated with increased 
neural activity in areas other than the motor cortex. These activations 
could well occur before the motor cortex is activated, but the imaging 
method used does not have the time resolution to answer this question. 
But even these limited results show that limiting analyses to the motor 
cortex is not sufficient. This is reinforced by the findings of Obhi and 
Haggard (2004) who found that awareness of conscious intent corre-
lates more specifically with a motor cortex potential over the side of the 
head opposite to the hand making the movement (hand movements 
are initiated from the opposite cerebral hemisphere).
A follow-up study by the Lau group did examine more closely the 
timing judgment issue (Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006). Specifically, 
they examined Libet’s finding that subjects misestimated the onset of 
movement, thinking it occurred about 50 ms before it actually did. 
In this Lau study, participants watched a red dot revolving around an 
unnumbered but calibrated clock face and introspectively indicated 
where the dot was when a conscious decision was made. They were 
required to fixate their gaze at a cross presented in the middle of the 
clock face, and press a button with their left index finger at a random 
time (whenever they felt the urge) after the dot has finished the first 
revolution. After the button was pressed, the dot disappeared after 
a  variable  period  of  1280–2560  ms.  A  random  variable  delay  was 
used so that subjects could not use the point where the dot disap-
peared to infer when they had pressed the button. After an additional 
4–10 s variable delay period, the red dot appeared again at the middle 
of the clock. The participants used a game-pad with their right thumb 
to control the dot on the screen as a cursor. They were required to move 
the dot to where it was on the clock face when they pressed the button. 
After the cursor stayed still for 1 s, it disappeared, and the position of 
the dot was recorded by the computer, and the difference in the re-
corded position and the position during the onset of the button press 
was translated into milliseconds. In the “action nontiming” condition, 
the dot disappeared after revolving for one cycle. The participants were 
required, as in the action timing condition, to make a spontaneous but-
ton press. When the button was pressed, the red dot reappeared briefly 
(duration: 200 ms) at a random location around the clock face and the 
participants were required to remember this location, which they had 
to report after a 4–10 s variable delay using the same method as in 
the action timing condition. While this is a significant departure in 
monitoring timing of events from the original studies, it still involves 
introspectively deciding when an action was willed and in addition 
introduces complex cognitive variables.
The Lau group reasoned that there must be some place in the brain 
that signals the judgment that movement has occurred and that across 
subjects the magnitude of the brain activity correlate would positively 
correspond to the accuracy of the time estimate. Alternatively, en-
hanced electrical activity might contribute to the time-estimate error, 
in which case the correlation would be negative. They also re-examined 
their earlier fMRI data to see if the same principle applies for judgment 
of the onset of intentions.
What they found confirmed many earlier studies that indicated 
that the brain makes errors in time estimation. When participants 
were required to estimate the time onset of their movements (instead 
of their intentions), the activity in the cingulate motor area was en-
hanced. Moreover, across subjects the level of cingulate activity was 
positively correlated with time-estimate accuracy. That is, the greater 
the cingulate activity, the earlier subjects estimated the time of move-
ment. The same principle seems to hold true for their earlier data on 
time estimates of onset of intention, as indicated by MRI changes in 
the pre-supplemental motor area. In other words, in both cases, time 
estimation could not be relied upon as accurate.
The  recent  studies  by  Chun  Soon  and  colleagues  (Soon, Brass, 
Heinze, & Haynes, 2008) used brain imaging in a design that was akin 
to Libet’s. However, they used a different method for introspective es-
timation of the instant of conscious decision. Subjects were asked to 
fixate on a screen where a stream of letters was presented. When they 
felt the urge, they were to decide on pressing one or two buttons, oper-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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ated by right and left index fingers. At the time of button press, they 
were to register and remember the letter that was present at the time of 
decision. After the button press, they were presented with a screen that 
had four letters on it, and subjects indicated which one was present at 
the time of decision.
Another difference from the Libet studies was that more than one 
behavioral option was required (press left or right). This was intended 
to counter the argument that Libet’s observed anticipatory electrical 
change might have reflected some kind of nonspecific preparatory 
activation.
They monitored the same area as did Libet, the supplemental motor 
area of cortex (SMA). However, they reasoned that the SMA is active 
in the late stages of a movement decision, and that other brain areas 
might be involved in movement planning at earlier times. 
What they found was astonishing (see Figure 2). Two regions in 
the frontal and cingulate cortex exhibited a decision-predictive change 
a full seven-to-ten seconds before conscious awareness of the decision. 
The areas of the motor cortex that actually issue movement commands 
showed slightly increased activity a second or so prior to the instant of 
decision, and much more pronounced activity about 2 s after the deci-
sion. The antecedent activity was seen only in the right motor cortex 
of presumably right-handed subjects, a point that the authors chose 
not to interpret. 
Activity  in  brain  areas  directly  involved  in  issuing  movement 
commands  (SMA  and  motor  cortex)  increased  greatly  after  deci-
sion. Increased activity in the other areas prior to awareness can be 
interpreted  in  more  than  one  way.  Most  people,  especially  the  lay 
press, assume that these other areas are subconsciously processing the 
decision to move and thus indicate absence of free will because they 
occur before subjects think they willed a movement. The authors were 
more restrained in wording their conclusion; namely, that the frontal 
and parietal cortical areas “influenced” the decision making up to 10 s 
before conscious decision to press one of the two buttons was realized. 
They view this early, pre-conscious activity as preparatory and also as 
a specific predictor of which button was to be pressed, but they did not 
choose to speculate further.
To me, an obvious interpretation is that frontal and cingulate cortex 
could have been processing the “rules of the game” and the free-will 
intent to move. The overlap with SMA activity seems inevitable in 
that rules of the game form a conscious context in which a willed act 
could occur at any moment. Obviously, rules of the game have to be 
processed initially in consciousness. However, once well-rehearsed, 
implementing intentions may be done without conscious awareness. 
However, a recent test of this issue by Bongers, Dijksterhuis, and Spears 
(2010) revealed that people do become aware of their goals and intents 
when pursuing a complex goal. It remains an open question whether 
this might apply to the Soon studies.
 This study has the same limitations as the others of presupposing 
that the decision to move and the conscious realization are instantane-
ous. As with the original Libet experiments, experimenters relied on 
self-report of the decision to move, which no doubt has limited time 
resolution and accuracy. This design is, however, better in that subjects 
recalled what letter was being viewed on the screen at the “instant” of 
decision. Their methods allowed looking back further in time prior to 
the “instant” of decision and in evaluating other brain areas that might 
be involved in the movement planning process. 
In designs like this, the subject knows as soon as one trial is over 
that another is beginning. Moreover, the subject consciously chooses 
to make a movement and the brain no doubt is planning to make such 
a movement long before a “go” signal is delivered via any decision-
making process. So, the pre-movement increased brain activity could 
actually reflect conscious processing in working memory of the “rules 
of the game” and the will to obey those rules. It is true that humans 
are not necessarily aware of all contents of working memory (Cowan, 
1997). But, all through a trial such as this, before decisions are made, 
the brain could be consciously processing in working memory a signif-
icant portion of at least five different things: (a) “I will make a button-
press movement,” (b) “I will make the press either on the right or left,” 
(c) “I will notice the letters on the screen and hold them in working 
memory,” (d) “I will issue a go decision voluntarily,” and (e) I will re-
member which letter was present on the screen when the go command 
is issued.” Accordingly, there may not be any single electrophysiological 
marker of when a decision is made, conscious or otherwise. This study 
could actually support a free-will interpretation. The activity increase 
in non-motor areas could have reflected conscious decision making 
Figure 2.
change in Mri activity in supplemental motor area (sMA), motor 
cortex, and localized areas in the frontal and cingulate cortex, be-
fore, during, and after awareness of a freely determined decision 
to press either a left or a right button. graphs are re-drawn for il-
lustrative purposes to show the timing relationships between the 
awareness of decision and Mri activity in the respective brain areas.  
From the data of c. s. soon, M. Brass, h.-J. heinze, & J.-d. haynes, 
2008, “Unconscious determinants of Free decisions in the human 
Brain,” Nature Neuroscience, 11, 543-545.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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before the actual movement. In other words, the “go” decision was only 
one final part of the consciously willed process.
A  more  recent  study  was  that  of  Michel  Desmurget  and  col-
leagues (2009) in France, who took a different approach. First, they 
distinguished between two processes, the will to make movements and             
the awareness of such willed action. This led them to consider the 
parietal cortex as a possible site that brings intentions into conscious 
awareness. Secondly, they used direct electrical stimulation rather than 
recording. The subjects were awake humans with electrodes inserted 
into the brain to help locate tumors that were not located in the re-
corded sites. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a 
strong intention to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas 
stimulating the left inferior parietal region produced an intention to 
make the movements of speaking. When stimulation strength was 
increased, subjects believed they had actually made such movements, 
even though monitoring of the relevant muscles showed no signs of 
muscle activation. 
As with all such studies, the investigators only considered a subset 
of all the brain areas that are known to be involved in willed actions.   
For example, there were no electrical stimuli delivered to frontal cortex 
areas that are known to be involved in generation of intent. Just be-
cause realization of intent is generated out of the parietal cortex, that 
does not mean that intents was generated there. Even so, whenever 
intent is generated, it clearly must precede the realization of intent, and 
their studies clearly showed that realization of intent can occur without 
movement.
This result does not fit the zombian theory, for there was clear sign 
of willed action even when no movement occurred. This paper cites 
earlier work by Fried and colleagues who showed that low-intensity 
electrical stimulation of the supplemental motor cortex in humans 
caused an urge to move. Stronger stimulation caused actual move-
ment. 
The lay press has commonly claimed this is proof of free will. 
I don’t go that far, because the data just show that the parietal cortex 
enables people to be aware of their intent, not whether that intent was 
first generated consciously. There is also the problem that the really 
crucial point was not tested. Namely, can subjects distinguish between 
a stimulus-induced feeling of intent and an internally generated actual 
intent? Only if such distinctions cannot be made can one conclude 
that stimulus induced feelings are a valid index for testing free will.
I conclude that since parietal stimulation never caused movement, 
it may be that parietal cortex is a “reporter” region that generates re-
alization of a free-will urge that is generated elsewhere in an area that 
provides input to pre-motor and motor cortex.
On the other hand, this work is a refreshing departure from Libet-
type  experiments.  Because  the  focus  is  on  stimulation,  the  limita-
tions are of a different kind. One might object that the seven subjects 
involved  had  abnormal  functions  because  of  the  nearby  tumors. 
However, the consistency of effects suggests that the results might have 
been obtained in tumor-free subjects. 
The authors noted the earlier research on the cognition of intention 
and the zombian theory. But they were careful not to endorse (or criti-
cize) the zombian theory. Instead, they made the limited interpretation 
that the will to move precedes movements and even intended move-
ments that do not occur.
The Soon study (Soon et al., 2008) has been followed up most 
recently with electrical recordings (Christophel & Haynes, 2009). Not 
surprisingly,  electrical  changes  from  multiple  scalp  electrode  loca-
tions occurred several seconds before subjects indicated a conscious 
decision to move. These results were intended to not only confirm the 
earlier fMRI results, but also as proof that such antecedent activity re-
flects subconscious decision making. The interpretative flaw remains: 
Decision making is assumed to be unconscious, with consciousness 
only having a reporter function. The increased activity at the time of 
reporting intent is defined as irrelevant to making a decision, which 
presumably was made subconsciously. But where is the actual evi-
dence? All such data really prove is what we already know: that there is 
antecedent neural activity.
Twelve INTeRpReTIve IssUes
I think that zombians commit at least 12 major fallacies of logic or ac-
cept insufficient data in interpreting experiments of this kind:
1. Increased neural activity has 
alternative interpretations that 
have not been ruled out
Haggard and Eimer (1999) reported that the potential has two phases, 
an initial stage where the readiness potential is evenly divided across 
the two hemispheres and a later lateralized phase. The lateralized phase 
actually coincides with conscious awareness and therefore could be a 
causal correlate of a freely willed action or at least guided the required 
movement. This finding raises the possibility that willed intentions 
may intermingle subconscious and conscious elements.
In the early ramp-up of the electrical signal, the change could signal 
that a movement command was about to be issued or that there was 
intention to move. Those are not identical processes. That intention 
could have been generated elsewhere, in areas of brain that were not 
being monitored.  Maybe the processing of intention triggers the ramp 
up at the same time as the processes that were signaling the awareness 
of the intention.
Another problem is that increased neural activity in a given brain 
area may not be limited to just one function. While that may not be true 
in motor cortex, the SMA and certainly frontal and cingulate cortex 
perform more than one function. Do not circuits in these areas overlap 
with other cortical circuits that process other things? Could not these 
circuits be recruited into a larger network that generates free will?
Zombians assume that evolving brain activity prior to conscious 
awareness of an intention to act is associated only with preparation 
for movement. That activity could reflect other kinds of processing, 
and Trevena and Miller (2010) have recently tested this assumption. 
They  compared  electrophysiological  activity  before  a  decision  to 
move with activity present before a decision not to move. There was 
no difference in the signal, and that argues against the conclusion that AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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the increased neural activity reflects preparation to move. Now, we have 
to consider the possibility that this antecedent neural activity actually 
reflects conscious processing of the respective decision to move or not 
move. Trevena and Miller suggested that the neural activity change 
may “simply develop as a consequence of some ongoing attention to 
or involvement with a task requiring occasional spontaneous move-
ments” (p. 454).
There was another significant difference in the methodology used 
in these two studies. The Libet paradigm tracks when subjects spon-
taneously intend to move, whereas in the Trevena and Miller study, 
subjects were given a tone cue, unpredictably presented, at which time 
they were to make a decision to move or not move. Gomes (2009) 
argues that the two conscious decision processes are therefore not 
comparable, though he concedes that the decision is spontaneous. He 
also disputes the claim that there was no difference in the observed an-
tecedent electrical potential, noting apparent differences in time course 
and amplitude of the readiness potential. So this debate will continue 
to rage.
One fundamental aspect of free will is the decision to act or not 
act, which was the choice available in typical Libet-type experiments. 
An fMRI study of what the brain does during intentional inhibiting 
revealed that a fronto-medial cortical area was more strongly activated 
when people willed a manual action, but then willed to cancel it than 
when they completed the same action (Brass & Haggard, 2007). Thus, 
this study revealed an important area of cortex, not motor cortex, that 
is  involved  in  controlling  choice  behavior.  Moreover,  this  area  ap-
pears selective for decisions to inhibit. This area is distinct from the 
areas that generate intentional actions, attend to intentions, or select 
between alternatives. The latter conscious decisions to act apparently 
arise elsewhere.
My take on this dispute is expressed in the title of this paper: Simple 
experiments are not so simple. Future studies should examine appro-
priate baseline measures of unspecific neuronal pre-decision activity 
in order to demonstrate the existence of decision-specific neuronal 
pre-decision activity.
2. Decisions are not instantaneous
One question that both neuroscientists and philosophers who endorse 
Libet-type experiments usually avoid is this: Why do we think that 
a decision is instantaneous? What we consciously think could well 
be spread out over time. The process can be on-going but our rea-
lization captures the process only as a snapshot in time that suffices 
to label the decision but not the process. A few philosophers, such 
as  Daniel  Dennett  (2003),  suggest  that  conscious  decisions  are 
smeared about in time and space (and thus correspond to distributed 
processing throughout many parts of the brain, not just the motor 
cortex  neurons  that  control  finger  movement).  Libet-type  experi-
ments  seem  to  fail  to  accommodate  the  possibility  that  a  freely 
willed intent can be generated early on, but consciously realized later 
because  decisions  have  to  “ramp  up”  until  a  threshold  is  reached 
when a person realizes the decision has been reached (Cleeremans, 
2008).
Moreover, in experiments like this the subject continuously wills 
to perform the task and to do so within the rules of the experimental 
paradigm. The only thing at issue is when to act. Even the decision of 
when to act is not instantaneous. Even if not verbalized with silent self 
talk, the subject has to monitor time and think consciously about what 
is an appropriate time to act. “Has too much time elapsed since the 
last act? Should I use a set pace of responding or use a semi-random 
pattern? Do I know which response pattern I am using? How often do 
I change my decision to act now or defer it?”
In a more complex situation, decision-making is an on-going proc-
ess. We weigh the evidence. We lean one way, then the other. Finally, 
the preponderance of evidence and the weights we assign to it lead to 
a decision. The decision itself may have been instantaneous but its 
process could have been dominated by free will choices spread out over 
days, months, or even years.
In Libet-type experiments, the neural activity begins its ramp up 
about the same time as the conscious urge to move occurs and reaches 
its peak at the time of actual movement. There is no necessity to be-
lieve, as many scientists do, that a movement has to be caused by an 
instantaneous burst of firing from one place in the brain. Causal activ-
ity may arise from many places within the brain that are functionally 
linked both sequentially and in parallel in ways that spread the process 
out in time. How can we know, for example, that the instant in time 
that Libet chose to observe crudely and perhaps inaccurately was the 
only or even the key instant at which the decision to move fingers was 
made? Where in the brain are such decisions made? Was that neural 
activity monitored? This same point is made by Roger Penrose (1994).   
3. Conscious realization of intent is 
not instantaneous 
Libet (1973) himself was the first to show that conscious realization 
itself can take at least 500 ms. In human subjects who were electri-
cally stimulated in the somatosensory cortex, the stimulus had to be 
delivered for 500 ms or longer before they realized the sensation. 
Given that there is nearly a half second delay in the appearance of 
a conscious threshold sensation, Libet and co-workers had to explain 
how persons report experiencing the sensation as if there is no delay, 
when the sensation is elicited by a stimulus pulse to the skin. They 
proposed that the time of the delayed awareness is subjectively referred 
backwards in time. This view has been criticized on the grounds of lack 
of evidence. However, this whole issue has been recently reviewed by 
Libet (2006), and he claims that he has proved the backward referral 
hypothesis. Stimulation of the subcortical cerebral pathway for specific 
projection to somatosensory cortex required the same 0.5 s repetitive 
train of stimuli to produce a threshold conscious sensation as did so-
matosensory cortex. However, unlike the cortex, each stimulus pulse 
in this subcortical pathway elicited a primary evoked response like that 
with a skin pulse. The very first stimulus pulse in in the thalamic me-
dial lemniscus or VPL nucleus, it is claimed, provides the hypothesized 
timing signal for backward time referral. For technical reasons, Libet 
used stimuli at the threshold intensity for a 200 ms train of pulses effec-
tive for a conscious sensory experience.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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In experiments of this type, two things have to be done at more 
or less the same time, neither of which can be assumed to be instan-
taneous. In addition to deciding when to move and realizing a willed 
decision has occurred, the subject also has to think consciously about 
the time indicator for the decision. To do this, one must be consciously 
aware of the indicator and integrate the movement into that awareness. 
Does the subject think about the clock in the context of “I am about to 
move and must make sure I note the time?” Or does the subject force 
a spontaneous movement and then switch attention, after significant 
delay, to note the time? Both the decision and the time recognition 
need external validation. Can the subject know for certain a deci-
sion has been made if he does not get visual or other confirmation of 
the act? How long does it take for proprioceptive or visual feedback 
to confirm the act has occurred and that the clock really showed X 
number of seconds?
Another line of evidence that it takes a while for a conscious re-
alization to become manifest comes from the research of Grill-Spector 
and Kanwisher (2005). With images presented in sequence, for exam-
ple, they found it takes up to about 100 ms to accomplish the correct 
conscious recognition of an event. In other words, subjects need this 
time after seeing an object to process in consciousness what it was and 
what category of objects it belongs to. At all time lags, accuracy was the 
same for detection that something was seen and its category, but was 
substantially less for realizing or identifying what the object was. On 
average, 65 ms were necessary for identification of what the object was 
than for its categorization, even when accuracy in the categorization 
and identification tasks was matched. Using visual images to test the 
time for conscious recognition of an event is especially useful evidence, 
because vision is an exceptionally high-speed process in the brain, very 
likely to be much faster than the conscious processes needed in a Libet 
type experiment where one must decide to move, determine what to do 
and with what body part to use to do it, and be consciously aware that 
these events have occurred. In other words, you can make a conscious 
decision to act, but it may take you several hundred milliseconds to 
become consciously aware of what you have decided. 
To conclude this argument, the causes for a given decision or be-
havior are so numerous and interconnected that we can’t identify and 
understand them all. When it comes to consciousness, there is no good 
reason to expect to find any particular point in time when conscious-
ness realization begins and ends.
4. Decision-making is not the only 
process going on 
Pacherie (2009) points out there is more to causation than the initial 
triggering. The event or action, such as deciding to press a button, may 
be shaped by an ongoing set of mental processes. These may even over-
lap in time. Conscious intent could guide, if not trigger, part or all of 
these processes. Free will need not be the first triggering event.
Actually, there could be four conscious processes going on prior 
to movement commands in the Libet designed experiment. In such 
experiments, the subject could be thinking the equivalent of
1) “I know the rules of this game and agree to play by them.”
2) “I intend to move soon (and withhold movement in the mean
while).”
3) “I realize and confirm that I have issued the order to move.”
4) “I notice and report the time I issued the order to move.”
Each of these is but one facet of consciousness, yet we need not 
necessarily witness all stages of a conscious choice being made. In 
some cases, we only witness (and monitor, as in the Libet experiment) 
the arrival of a portion of the conscious choice. Decision-making is a 
process, not solely an event. The same principle applies to subconscious 
decisions, but I make the point here because zombians seem to over-
look the role of multi-step processes in conscious decision making.
Most theorists tend to ignore the full dimensions of these conscious 
processes, focusing only step three as the single important incident. 
They gloss over the role of steps one and two in biasing the relevant 
time-monitoring mechanisms and the movement systems involved not 
only in making the movement but also for reporting the moment of 
intent. Step 4 is usually not recognized to exist as a separate — and time 
delayed — process.
To help understand that complex cognitive processes cannot be 
explained by simplistic experiments, no matter how ingenious, let us 
recapitulate what could be happening during a decision to make a 
movement (Figure 3). External stimuli or even internally generated sig-
nals would generate a conscious decision to perform a given act. These 
signals could activate memory banks as a check on the appropriateness 
of the movement in the context of what has been learned about mak-
ing such a movement. The reward system might be activated to assign 
value to the making of such a movement, weighing the expected im-
mediate utility with the longer-term value. The emotional networks of 
the limbic system may be activated to see what level of passion, if any, is 
appropriate to the movement. Movement control networks have to be 
activated in order to plot a trajectory and to evaluate the correctness of 
the anticipated movement. There are pre-motor areas of cortex that are 
probably engaged in the planning for the movements that are to be exe-
cuted. The single brain area monitored by Libet certainly should not be 
the temporal bench mark for deciding the time relations between con-
Figure 3.
constellation of processes that participate in making an intention, 
choice, or decision.
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scious decision and engagement of motor control processes. A properly 
designed experiment would monitor other areas of the brain, preferably 
multiple areas at the same time, with monitoring protocols that could 
serve as a better indicator of when a conscious decision was made. 
Even  free-will  critic,  Daniel  Wegner  (2002),  concluded  that  mul-
tiple brain systems had to underlie the experience of will and that these 
areas do not seem to the same systems that cause the actual action.
5. Decision-making and decision-
realization are likely to be 
separate processes 
This could impose delays because both processes could require numer-
ous synapses in widely distributed circuits, whereas the movement 
command can be executed via as few as two or three synapses of 
the pyramidal tract neurons in the motor cortex that project uninter-
ruptedly to a lower-motor neuron in the spinal cord.
The earlier mentioned studies on the relatively long time it takes to 
realize a decision supports the notion of separate mechanisms. Recall 
also the Soon et al.’s (2008) demonstration of a full 10 s of activity prior 
to willed actions.
 It is also possible that conscious realization processes are not com-
plete until they are confirmed by feedback from seeing and feeling that 
the movement has actually occurred. Realization captures the process 
as a snapshot in time, but the antecedent process of realization could 
go unrecorded. 
Finally, willing a finger movement is too simple to have much 
bearing on such conscious processes as the decisions made through 
introspection, planning a course of action that spans past and future, 
or analysis of complex events.
6. Not all intentions are for simple 
movements
Willing a stereotyped, well-rehearsed finger movement is too simple to 
have much bearing on such conscious processes as the decisions made 
through planning a course of action that spans past and future, or 
analysis of complex events. Why, therefore, would anybody be sur-
prised at absence of a robust antecedent indicator of willed finger 
movement? 
There is also the issue of the kinds of movement we wish to corre-
late with conscious intent.  In speech movements, for example, we have 
all experienced high-speed conversation, clearly controlled by con-
scious intent to express thoughts, both spontaneous and in response 
to what is said by others. Consider all the thoughts one has to hold 
in conscious working memory to conduct intelligent conversation. 
We think consciously about what is in working memory as we use it. 
Libet-type experiments don’t seem to fit into such real-world conscious 
experiences. True, conversation often contains knee-jerk responses, 
no doubt subconsciously driven. But it is hard to defend a position 
that conscious mind is just an observer of a lively, intelligent conver-
sation.
Finally, what are we to make of choices or decisions where no 
immediate  motor  act  is  involved?  Recall  the  studies  of  Desmurget 
et al. (2009). What experiment could cast doubt on the free will in-
volved in self talk, setting goals, making plans, adjusting attitude,  de-
veloping belief systems, or any decisions or choice not involving action 
or active refusal to act? 
7. Not all willed intentions are 
formed in acts of decision 
Especially in the case of habits, decisions may have been made long 
before the initiation of an act. That is to say, as Mele (2009) points out, 
an intention to do something can arise without being actively formed 
from a decision process. Not only are some habits originally formed 
consciously, but the choice to deploy a habit may be made consciously 
and certainly, as Libet suggested, be vetoed consciously. Of course, once 
habits are initiated, they may be executed with little or no conscious 
involvement (Hommel, 2000). In the early days of human-movement 
science, Fitts and Posner (1967) formalized the commonly accepted 
notion that learning movement skills progresses from an early stage 
where consciousness directs the process, but in later stages, the move-
ments become automated. Pressing a button is a skill so simple and so 
readily learned it  becomes automated easily and quickly. Why would 
anybody be surprised that a button press could be done without being 
consciously driven? On what logical grounds can zombians leap to the 
conclusion that all behavior is automated?
Additionally, conscious performance of a behavioral act can be of 
different types. In a typical free-will experiment, the subjects’ mental 
processes dynamically fuse the three categories of conscious intent: 
future, present, and motor (Pacherie, 2009). Present and motor inten-
tions occur simultaneously with the behaviors they are guiding, but this 
is not true of future intentions. Further, a behavioral act can have three 
conscious components: know that we are doing something, knowing 
what we are doing, and knowing how we are doing it. I would add, 
why we are doing a given thing. All of these elements (future, present, 
and motor; that, what, how, and why) are present and confounded in 
Libet-type experiments and most others.
Even though neural mechanisms that cause these components of 
an act may not be accessible to consciousness, this is not proof there 
is no role of conscious intent. Intentions for any or all of these com-
ponents might have an element of conscious causation. Moreover, all 
these components can be smeared across time, making highly suspect 
the introspective judgments about associated willed action and time. 
8. Conscious decisions can be 
temporally uncoupled from the 
action 
I may decide this morning, for example, to be more thoughtful toward 
my spouse. Opportunity to do that may not arise for hours, as for 
example, when I come home from work that evening. When the op-
portunity arises that evening to be thoughtful, do I have to re-make the 
decision? No, it had already been made hours ago. So, when I do nice 
things that evening, the new behavior resulted from a choice action at 
that moment, not a decision made hours ago. One could argue (but 
not test) that the evening’s behavior was generated subconsciously, but AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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it could not have been driven by the process of making a conscious 
decision, because that had already been done. 
Another example of uncoupling comes from studies of Galdi et al. 
(Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008). They tested the predictive effect of 
automatic mental associations of undecided individuals (as in deciding 
who to vote for in an election). The results indicated that future choices 
of undecided voters could be predicted by their current automatic 
mental associations, even when voters insist that they are undecided. 
Sometimes decided individuals had already made up their minds, even 
though they consciously insisted they were still undecided.
However, all such observations prove is that self-reported conscious 
decisions can be biased by subconscious influences. No surprise there. 
Once in the voting booth, the act of where on the ballot to check could 
still be a conscious choice where one has the option to endorse their 
bias or reverse it. 
9. Introspection is an unreliable 
indicator of when a freely willed 
action is made 
Introspective  judgments  about  conscious  intent  are  not  necessar-
ily reliable. In one study of this point, participants made conscious 
choices of presented face pairs, based on attractiveness of the faces. 
After a short delay, subjects were then shown their choice. However, 
experimenters covertly manipulated the relationship between choice 
and outcome as experienced by the subjects, yet subjects often failed 
to notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and 
the outcome they were presented. Nevertheless, their introspective re-
ports reflected a blindness to what actually happened. Subjects actually 
developed confabulations to account for the mismatches (Johansson, 
Hall,  Sikström, & Olssonet, 2005).
Unreliability  of  introspection  was  found  with  an  experimental 
design intended to objectify introspective judgments of awareness of 
intention by Kühn and Brass (2007).They used a stop-signal paradigm 
and an intentional-signal paradigm and found evidence they argued 
supported the zombian hypothesis. Specifically, subjects sometimes 
(note, not always) indicated free choices when reaction times suggested 
that they failed to stop the action. In a second experiment, misattribu-
tion of awareness of intention varied with intentional involvement 
during planning the action.
Moreover, introspection is not the only way to study free-will is-
sues. Social psychology literature is often not considered in debates 
about free will, yet that field uses other than Libet-type tests to address 
the role of consciousness in decision making. With new experimental 
designs social psychology approaches might assist in distinguishing 
subconscious and freely willed actions. 
One approach is the study of habits. Habits provide the utility of 
performing acts without conscious awareness, thus “making room” 
for doing things that necessarily require conscious processing. When 
habits are established, the very activation of the goal to act  auto-
matically enables the habitual response. When behavior is habitual, 
behavioral responses are activated automatically. However, results of 
three experiments indicated that the automaticity in habits is condi-
tional on the pre-existing presence of an active goal which might be 
freely willed (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). There should be experimen-
tal designs that test the role of free will in both forming and breaking of 
habits.
It is argued that this sequential relation of goal and habit execution 
increases the likelihood that individuals rely on subjective experience 
particularly under conditions that prevent considering retrieved con-
tents. However, this view is not supported by all experimental designs 
(see Kuhnen, 2010).
Another approach is that by Pessiglione et al. (2007), who used a 
paradigm that varied monetary rewards for which subjects exerted 
physical effort. Even when subjects could not report how much money 
was at stake, they nevertheless deployed more physical force for higher 
amounts. Thus, behavior was energized subconsciously by expected 
rewards.
A test of free will might be designed in which one reports knowl-
edge of the contingencies in a situation in which a decision or choice 
was made. If such knowledge is recognized, the act is likely free willed. 
When  contingencies  are  not  recognized,  subconscious  processes 
caused it.
Alternatively, tests of free will might involve choices or decisions 
that  are  habitual  (and  therefore  subconscious)  with  those  that  are 
first-time events (and therefore could be reasoned and freely willed). 
Of special interest in such studies would be electrographic indices that 
might differentiate habitual versus first-time choice events (see later 
proposals on EEG recording).
10. Inappropriate reliance on 
awareness of actions and time 
estimation accuracy 
Conscious awareness of time is central to the issue of when decisions 
and  actions  are  consciously  or  subconsciously  generated.  In  self-
reported awareness of a conscious decision, the issue is whether the in-
tention occurred prior to action or if the awareness was reconstructed 
after the action occurred. 
It only takes mention of a few studies to make the case that hu-
mans are not precise in their awareness of time compared with actual 
time on a fraction of a second scale. Ono and Kawahara (2005), for 
example, showed that subjects made major errors in time estimation 
when instructed to keep visual displays on a screen for a fixed time. 
Moreover, the accuracy was affected by prior priming experience with 
the images.
 Ulrich, Nitschke, and Rammsayer (2006) review a variety of re-
ports show that time estimation accuracy is affected by experimental 
conditions, such as stimulus modality, degree of attentiveness to time, 
and level of arousal. Their own experiments showed that time estimates 
were affected by prior expectations about visual stimuli.
One recent study (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009) examined 
the time accuracy that subjects had for the interval between their 
key press movement and a tone. The movement was produced either 
voluntarily or passively by a motor. Subjects grossly underestimated 
time intervals for both voluntary and involuntary movements. Three AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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of the 14 subjects were so erratic in time estimation that their data were 
omitted from analysis. To manipulate the sense of agency, experiments 
included priming the subjects with thoughts relevant to the movement 
just before it was made. Timing estimates were modulated by such 
priming, becoming greatest for involuntary movements. A second ex-
periment showed that this modulation depended on prime–movement 
(temporal) contiguity.
The  key  point  of  these  findings,  in  the  view  of  Synofzik  et  al. 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Lindner, 2009), is that optimal cue integra-
tion seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. This means, of 
course, that test designs may fail to affirm free-will intentions simply 
because cue integration was not optimal. In any case, the study shows 
unequivocally the unreliability of time estimation.
 In the Libet experiments, the subjects could have been wrong in 
their reading of the clock. There could have been a lag of a fraction of a 
second between the time they made a conscious decision to move and 
the time that they noted and their brains packaged that information 
for verbal delivery to the investigators. Libet himself noted an error of 
about 200 ms in the subjects’ recall of the times when they first became 
aware of sensations.
Stanley Klein (2002) re-plotted Libet’s original data and found that 
observers had great uncertainty about the relative timing of events. He 
also points out that the Libet design required responses that were dif-
ficult to judge.
Several experiments document that it takes time to process visual 
information consciously. In an experiment originated by Nijhawan, 
subjects assess the timing of an object passing a flashbulb. The timing 
is exact: The bulb flashes precisely as the object passes. But subjects 
perceive  that  the  object  has  moved  past  the  bulb  before  it  flashes 
(Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003).
 This suggests that the brain projects a moving event a split second 
into the future, seemingly working on old information. Apparently, the 
brain needs time to consciously register what the eye sees. In the con-
text of a Libet type experiment, realizing the location of a clock hand 
could occur later than what the time actually was.
Various investigators have raised questions about the accuracy of 
time awareness under conditions specifically relevant to Libet-type 
experiments.  For  example,  Joordens,  van  Duin,  and  Spalek  (2002) 
directly examined potential biases in this task by asking subjects to 
make subjective timing decisions about a stimulus. Subjects consist-
ently tended to report events as happening about 70 ms later than they 
had actually occurred.
A specific re-examination of time awareness accuracy in the Libet 
paradigm has been reported by Danquah, Farell, and O’Boyle (2008). 
Using the control condition of the Libet method, subjects had to judge 
the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock indicator of time. 
Response accuracy varied systematically with the sensory modality of 
the stimulus and with the speed of the clock. If these indicators of ex-
ternally observable events are inaccurate, the researchers suggest that 
their time estimation may also be inaccurate for endogenous events.
In addition to reaction-time lags and errors, there is no accurate 
coupling  of  perceptual  awareness  of  time  and  actual  time.  Many 
scientists are now starting to study how the brain is aware of time and 
tracks it in relation to events. Although these studies are not done 
in the free-will context, they are very relevant because they teach us 
about the brain’s limitations in being aware of time and events in 
time.
Awareness of time is only one indicator of how well humans are 
aware of their actions, and it can be argued that humans have aware-
ness limitations that go beyond time awareness. For example, a just 
published paper reports that awareness of our actions depends on a 
combination of factors involving what we intend to do and what we 
actually did. Sarrazin, Cleeremans, and Haggard (2008) report an ex-
periment in which subjects were instructed to reach consciously for 
a target that jumped unpredictably on some trials. Subjects were to 
express their expectation of a target shift, point at the target as fast as 
possible, and reproduce the spatial path of the movement they had just 
made. The last step of reproducing the trajectory was taken as an index 
of the awareness of the previous action.
The accuracy of reproducing the trajectory was measured in terms 
of the degree of movement undershoot or overshoot. On trials where 
subjects  thought  there  would  be  a  target  shift,  the  overshoot  was 
greater and the undershoot less than on trials with lower expectancy. 
Thus, conscious expectancy affected the awareness of what had taken 
place.
  Time-awareness accuracy is confounded by the likelihood that 
the whole process of decision making and monitoring has many ele-
ments  that  combine  subconscious  and  conscious  processes.  Of  all 
these processes, Libet only observed that the “action” stage had only 
started before subjects thought they had issued a command to move. 
The Canadian scholar, Merlin McDonald (2001) makes my point by 
stressing that the time scale used in Libet-like studies is too short to ad-
equately capture all conscious processes. In the Libet study, the actual 
movement did not occur until after subjects thought they had decided 
to move, which allows for the possibility that the processes above could 
have participated in a conscious will to move. Some portion of these 
processes occurs at a subconscious level that could have primed the 
motor cortex to start a readiness ramp up of activity to await final con-
firmation from conscious decision making.
And how do we explain other kinds of decisions that are so rapid 
that long preparation periods are not possible?  For example, one news 
story on free-will research began this way: “You might think you just 
decided to read this story on a passing whim — but your brain actually 
decided to do it up to 10 s ago, a new study claims.”
The problem here is that I made that decision to read in a split sec-
ond, because I had just clicked a hyperlink to take me to the Web page 
where the story was posted. My brain could not have made a decision 
much in advance, because my brain did not know such a site existed 
more than a few milliseconds earlier.  It is still possible, of course, this 
rapid decision-making occurred in my subconscious before I realized 
I made it. But in my conscious mind, I certainly considered whether 
following a hyperlink was likely to be worth my time, and I could have 
rejected whatever decision was fed to my consciousness from subcon-
scious processes. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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11. Unwarranted extrapolation to 
all mental life
Just because subconscious choices are made prior to conscious aware-
ness in one task is not proof that all mental life is governed this way. 
How can intelligent people extrapolate and generalize a simple move-
ment to all other conscious processes the brain performs? How can this 
kind of methodology possibly be appropriate to test for free will in such 
conscious cognition choices as deciding on an optimal plan, a correct 
problem solution, what to conclude, the appropriate interaction with 
others, which words to use in conversation, or what attitudes and emo-
tions to embrace?
 Complex tasks are probably performed in different ways than 
simple ones. Yet zombians seem to assume that the mechanisms in 
this simple button-press task are the same as in such complex tasks 
as conversation, planning, attitude adjustment, introspection, problem 
analysis, etc. It may be that the reflex-like button press response is so 
simple that the unconscious mind performs it and has no need to 
assign or recruit assistance from conscious mind in making the deci-
sion.
All of the experiments used to support the zombian conclusion are 
of the same basic and quite limited type. But there are different forms of 
intentions and any given form may not be as simple as it seems. Many 
neural processes are going on that are not taken into account, even in 
the simplest designs (Figure 4).
This scheme more correctly describes, I think, what the brain must 
be doing to make the simple finger movements in the Libet-type ex-
periment. This scheme should make clear why the measurements in 
such experiments cannot possibly be an accurate reflection of all that 
is going on. More specifically, there is no way to show that the ramp up 
in motor cortex activity occurred before a long sequence of operations 
involving intent generation, conscious working memory of the “rules 
of the game,” the instant of intent realization, the realization of the time 
of intent, and the linguistic preparation for declaring the information. 
Some of these processes, such as ongoing working memory of the 
“rules of the game,” are clearly present before ramp up of motor cortex 
activity.
A series of processes occur in parallel over time. Rehearsal of the 
“rules of the game” occurs continually. This is the context in which 
everything else occurs. One process involves first the decision to make 
a movement at some point. This is followed by consciously inform-
ing oneself that now is the time for a movement to be made (“what to 
do”) and also to choose the correct hand to activate the actual motion 
(“body part to use”). Then, after significant delay, the conscious mind 
realizes that these decisions are now complete and readies itself for ac-
tion. This is followed by the activation of motor cortex to prepare for 
and execute the movement. The brain has to decide to split or divert 
attention from the movement commands to noting the time. Time of 
decision has to be estimated and consciously realized for subsequent 
reporting.
In parallel, a set of processes is triggered, first involving integration 
of the command to move and to do so with the right hand. This is fol-
lowed by the activation of motor cortex to prepare for movement and 
finally initiate the movement. 
Figure 4.
in a typical libet-type experiment, it seems possible that all of the processes, except for the two with shadowed backgrounds, are 
performed consciously.  note that they are intermixed in time and they cannot be interpreted unambiguously.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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The most salient point is that many of these cognitive processes 
have to be held in conscious working memory, in order to perform 
the expected task. These working-memory tasks are smeared out across 
time and there may not be any single electrophysiological signature of 
their occurrence
Next, compare this kind of processing with what happens in many 
areas of cognition. For example, consider the process for writing a 
scien-tific paper, assuming all data have already been analyzed (Figu-
re 5). Even though it is unclear to what extent subconscious processes 
operate, it is clear that conscious thought dominates all of these steps 
on  a continuing basis. How relevant can Libet-type experiments be?
12. Conflicting data or 
interpretations are ignored 
Recall the data of Soon’s group (Soon et al., 2008), which showed in-
creased activity in two regions of the frontal and parietal cortex a full 
7-10 s before conscious awareness. This was considered evidence of 
unconscious motor preparation. There is no basis for believing it takes 
10 s for unconscious mind to prepare motor pathways for a button-
press movement. Why do zombians assume this predictive change re-
flects motor preparation instead of the processing of free will and other 
cognitive functions associated with the “rules of the game?” These 
areas of brain normally have conscious functions and not movement 
functions. Is this not bias?
Zombian  bias  may  even  keep  investigators  from  looking  for 
evidence crucial to the argument; namely, neural representation of 
intention. Yet, there is enough evidence to indicate there are neural 
representations of intention, as for example in the Desmurget study 
(Desmurget et al., 2009). A slow time scale allows for conscious aware-
ness of intent, development of plans and “on-the-fly” adjustments. 
Consciousness allows us to think in the future, to anticipate what we 
need to do to get what we want and to plan accordingly. Such inten-
tional planning has a neural representation and can even be detected 
experimentally in animals. In one such study, Sam Musallam, Richard 
Andersen, and colleagues (Musallam, Cornell, Greger, Scherberger, 
& Andersen, 2004) eavesdropped on neurons in a planning area of 
monkey brain. They put electrodes in an area of cortex that was known 
to be required for planning, but not actually making, arm movements 
to reach a target. The planning area in monkeys is a small patch of 
cortex just above the ears. Monkeys were trained to “think about” a cue 
presented on a computer screen that told them to plan a movement 
toward an icon on a screen that had just flashed on a screen in one of 
up to eight locations. Each location was associated with a certain firing 
pattern in the planning neurons. Here is a clear case where the will to 
do something was established long before any action occurred. While 
monkeys thought about the required movement, computer analysis of 
the firing patterns of these neurons could predict what the monkey 
was intending to do — tantamount to reading the monkey’s mind. The 
researchers knew that it was intention that was represented, not actual 
movement or even planning for movement, because the monkeys were 
trained to get reward only when they withheld actual movement but 
nonetheless made the correct planning, as indicated by their neural 
firing patterns. Whether or not the monkeys were consciously aware 
of what was going on is another question. But it is clear that these 
animals have a mind that contains neural representations for decision 
processes, and these neurons are active prior to planning for motion or 
even in the absence of movement.
  If a monkey can make decisions for the future, surely we can. Of 
course, planning can be subconscious or conscious, and this argument 
is moot, if one believes that monkeys are incapable of consciousness.
COmmON-expeRIeNCe examples Of 
fRee wIll 
Numerous common-sense examples could be constructed to illustrate 
complex situations wherein conscious intent can occur. The examples 
I give are all based on presumed conscious free will to make certain 
movements. This limited view is chosen because the research that sug-
gests free will to be an illusion has been based on intent to make the 
most simple kinds of movements, such as a button press. 
Here is one example: You are driving a car in heavy traffic and 
another car runs a red light, pulling into your path. You can realize 
the full nature of the emergency and intend to turn the steering wheel 
appropriately and move your foot off of the accelerator and onto the 
brake pedal long before you can make such movements. You may not 
be able to avoid the accident that you consciously intended to avoid. 
Figure 5.
simplified outline of the stream of conscious decisions needed to 
write a scientific paper. the research reviewed here provides no 
support that such operations are all performed subconsciously 
and that conscious mind has no role in the multitude of decisions, 
many of which overlap in time.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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The analysis of the emergency, the intent to make certain movements, 
and the motor execution is all completed in a fraction of a second. And 
we need to take into account the fact that a decision can be made but 
not consciously detected for up to a half second. How likely then is it 
that all this was figured out subconsciously, then conscious awareness 
was engaged, and then conscious awareness was realized in that same 
instant? How can the responses be generated subconsciously when 
the subconscious has not been preprogrammed for such movements? 
From beginning to end of the episode, conscious intent processes are 
clearly operative. Though zombians reject such analysis, can they fal-
sify the hypothesis of conscious intent?
 Here is another example that football fans can relate to: In almost 
every game there is at least one play where a pass receiver drops the ball 
because he was consciously thinking not only about catching the ball 
but also about defensive backs that he heard thundering toward him 
and was thinking about the moves he would make after the catch. All 
this was going on in conscious mind long before the brain issued the 
movement commands needed to catch the ball. You might argue that 
the preparation to move was triggered before all the conscious realiza-
tions about the pass-receiving context, but that can’t be measured. As 
in the car accident case above, there is no way the subconscious is pre-
programmed to make all the right movements, given all the variables 
involved and the uniqueness of every pass-catching challenge. In any 
case, it seems clear that conscious thought and decisions were being 
made well before complex motor commands were issued and adjusted 
in the last few milliseconds to adjust to the ball’s trajectory and speed to 
accomplish the desired movements.
  True, intent to move might be preceded by unconscious prepara-
tions and rudimentary alternative sets of muscle commands that could 
be considered for movement. But it is hard to argue that conscious 
thought about how and when to move is preceded solely by uncon-
scious processes. Conscious planning, by common-sense definition 
at  least,  commonly  precedes  action.  Scientists  will  point  out  that 
common-sense can be wrong. But so can scientific dogma. 
If  subconscious  mind  does  everything,  and  conscious  mind 
is  merely  a  by-stander  that  may  intervene  on  occasion,  we  have 
a  problem  in  explaining  the  decisions  and  conclusions  we  make 
in: 
1) Attitudes and beliefs we choose to make as a result of introspec-
tion. 
2) Conclusions we choose to make from literature, poetry, art, or 
music.
3) Deciding what words to use in rapid conversation.
4) Choices we make about time (past, present, and future).
5) Intentions we use in early-stage learning, such as riding a bi-
cycle or touch typing.
6) Deciding what to believe in politics, religion, etc.
7) Decisions to take or avoid responsibility.
8) Choices that emanate from conscious analysis.
9) Choices made in developing plans for the future.
10)  Feedback  adjustments  to  ideas,  attitudes,  emotions,  and 
behavior?
The subconscious mind surely participates in all of these human 
cognitive activities, but to presume that all of these activities are gov-
erned only by subconscious mind is an assault on human reason. Only 
a few scientific studies of free will have been performed, and each has 
involved only decisions to make simple movements that one already 
knows how to do. These studies have seriously flawed assumptions 
and interpretations. Also, each of these studies is contaminated by the 
requirement of pre-requisite processing needed to hold in conscious 
working memory the rules of the experimental game. In other words, 
I think that scientists who argue against free will have jumped to con-
clusions — hardly a judicious scientific stance. Until science provides 
evidence (as opposed to speculation cloaked in pseudo-scientific garb) 
it is scientifically irresponsible and dogmatic to insist there is no such 
thing as free will. It seems to me that such scientists are left with argu-
ing from authority, as indicated by their citing Darwin and Einstein as 
zombian allies (Sommers, 2007).
Cognitive tasks come in wide variety, and a “one size fits all” ex-
planation about whether or not they are zombian is not appropriate. 
Certain musculoskeletal actions require consciousness, not only for 
monitoring the action but in some cases for initiating it. Not all ele-
ments of a consciously initiated action are freely willed; in fact most 
elements may be controlled subconsciously. Perhaps button pressing 
falls into this category.
There are several forms of intentions, according to Pacherie (2009). 
These include intentions to do something now or do it in the future. 
There are also specific motor intentions, commonly the focus in free-
will experiments. Motor intentions occur in two classes, control and 
guidance, and they can occur on a time scale of a “micropresent,” which 
only partially overlaps the present conscious state. Pacherie argues that 
conscious intentions can cause a behavior without necessarily giving 
rise to an experience of conscious will. If so, lack of evidence for free 
will is not evidence for zombianism.
The  differences  between  conscious  and  unconscious  actions 
are  subtle  (Morsella,  2005).  No  less  subtle  are  the  differences  be-
tween conscious actions that are freely willed and those that are not. 
Consciousness can simply exist as a state (“I think, therefore I am“), or 
it can be a free-will agent. Of course both elements can occur concur-
rently. 
Morsella (2005) likes to focus on task demands and whether or not 
they are “penetrable“ to conscious operation. The difference between 
conscious and unconscious processes, he says, lies in the kinds of infor-
mation that have to be taken into account in order to produce adaptive 
behavior. Motor acts in the typical free-will experiment are so simple 
they may not even need to be penetrable by consciousness. One could 
employ similar logic to assert that some conscious intentions are so 
simple they don‘t require a free-will trigger, but others so complex that 
they could not occur without it. More complex motor acts may require, 
for example, planning, which perhaps cannot be completed without 
some element of freely willed choices and decisions. In a Libet-type 
experiment, the motor act may be so simple that it can be performed 
with minimal free-will intent, which, lacking robustness, is poorly and 
slowly identified through introspection.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Morsella (2005) does seem to suggest that most of consciously initi-
ated action is not freely willed. His supramodular interaction theory 
envisions choices and decisions to arise from dynamic interactions 
of multiple response systems. That is, these systems respond to con-
tingencies to generate intent and motor command. In that sense, the 
over-all phenomena could be conscious and even willed, but not freely 
willed. This view, of course, raises the thorny issue of what is a free 
choice. Obviously, all choices can be influenced by prior learning. But 
what about choices for which there has been no relevant past expe-
rience? When such choices are made consciously, they could satisfy a 
free-will criterion if the task were sufficiently novel and complicated. 
In high-speed conversation, for example, consciousness may be an es-
sential mechanism for solving the problem of integrating processes in a 
largely parallel brain that must satisfy the demands of a skeletal-motor 
system (lips and tongue in this case) that can express intentions and 
corresponding actions only one at a time. In other words, you couldn‘t 
perform the speaking task without instantiating free will.
Zombians reject common-sense arguments. Yet, I have not seen 
anyone make the following point, which I believe to be irrefutable: 
In learning a new skill, such as playing the piano, there is no way the 
subconscious mind can control movements in the beginning, because 
it has no way of knowing what to do. Only the conscious mind can 
choose which keys to press because only it knows what should be done. 
If that is not free will, what is?
peRsONal RespONsIbIlITy
The free-will issue is more than an arcane scholarly argument. There 
are serious adverse social consequences to the zombian view. Positions 
become politicized. In a zombian world, people are more likely to be 
victims and less able to change maladaptive attitudes and behaviors. 
Thus, society and government must help them do what they cannot 
do for themselves. In a free-will world, people can choose to extricate 
themselves from misfortune.
This is not to advocate teleologically that free will exists because 
it is personally and socially adaptive. On the other hand, is it possible 
that free-will has great adaptive value and therefore evolved through 
natural selection forces? Evolutionary considerations should not be 
dismissed out of hand. Darwin could have made this point, but chose 
to reach an opposite conclusion.
If we have no free will, then there is not much we can do to improve 
ourselves or our plight in life. Or even if there are things that can be 
done to change us and our situations, the approach will surely have to 
be different if we can’t initiate the change by force of our free will. The 
government or schools or some other outside force must program our 
subconscious.
The argument is central to the issue of personal responsibility. To 
believe in the absence of free will creates an intolerable social nihilism. 
If there is no “I“ in charge, then there is no reason to demand or expect 
personal responsibility. All manner of bad brains and bad behavior can 
be excused. If we believe there is no free will, how can we defend our 
criminal justice system? If people cannot make choices freely, and if all 
their decisions emanate from subconscious processes, then how can we 
hold them responsible for unacceptable morals or behavior? Criminals 
should only be given punishment that reduces the likelihood of pre-
venting further crime. The brain committed the crime. If we have no 
free will, it is inhumane to punish criminals or even terrorists. Indeed, 
the only justification for locking anybody up for misdeeds would be 
to protect society from further crime. Capital punishment has to be 
banned, as indeed it is in many parts of the world. In the minds of 
some, criminals are victims. It is true that exercise of personal respon-
sibility is harder for some than others. To be sure, most murderers have 
been found to have a standard profile that includes childhood abuse, 
and some kind of neurological or psychiatric disorder (Gazzaniga, 
1998). But many non-murderers have a similar profile. How can lack 
of free will explain such difference? The monstrous magnitude of zom-
bian nihilism requires us to reject cavalier acceptance of research that 
purports to show that there is no free will.
The reality is that most people have brains that can learn social 
norms and choose socially appropriate behavior. Ignoring those norms 
is a choice. How can anyone seriously contend that people have no 
conscious preferences, that we are driven only by impulses and desires? 
How can anyone contend that all our impressions, beliefs, value sys-
tems, and preferences are not molded by conscious choice? How can 
anyone seriously argue a person is not responsible for criminal and evil 
behavior? 
Responsibility is not only a social construct, it is also learned by 
the brain. And the brain has the power to make learning choices that 
are not easy. A terrible childhood, for example, need not condemn 
one to an immoral or underachieving life. Conspicuous examples of 
Figure 6.
emergence of free will from brain operations – a traditional 
view.  Unconscious  mind,  originating  in  the  spinal  cord  and 
brainstem, forms a substrate for developing a subconscious 
mind (white arrows and dotted line), which in turn can yield 
a conscious mind from which free will can emanate. note that 
conscious mind is shown as the “tip of an ice berg,” beneath 
which lie more basic neural processes.
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willful rising above their environment include Abraham Lincoln and 
Thomas Huxley. Sigmund Freud was a cocaine addict. George Patton 
hallucinated. Merriweather Lewis, of the Lewis and Clark expedition, 
was a manic depressive. 
Also,  some  brain  abnormalities  are  created  by  the  lifestyle  and 
thought and behavioral choices that a person freely chooses. You will 
probably mess up your brain by snorting cocaine or smoking pot, but 
that behavior is something you chose to do. You may program your 
brain badly by associating with the wrong people, but again, that is 
a choice not a necessity.
  The desire to do something can arise from subconscious compul-
sions. But it can also reflect operation of the conscious mind. We can 
will ourselves into thoughts and actions. A way to think of the relation-
ship of mind to free will is illustrated in Figure  6.
pROpOsal fOR NexT geNeRaTION Of 
expeRImeNTs
If free will exists, then there should be some neural correlates when 
such will is being exercised. No one knows what those correlates are, 
mainly because they haven’t been looked for. Primitive assumptions 
about  neural  mechanisms  of  consciousness  underlie  many  of  the 
limitations of free-will research. Electrical recordings, brain scans, or 
stimulation of any one area of brain cannot provide much information 
about consciousness. Consciousness is not a thing in a place, but rather 
a process in a population, and that population undoubtedly is engaged 
in widely distributed parallel processes of complex-system dynamics. 
The current technology best suited for study of consciousness is the 
EEG, especially when quantified in terms of frequencies and coher-
ence relationships among various brain areas at successive points in 
time.
Free-will research frequently has put the “cart before the horse” 
with attempts to use neural activity indicators of intent, choice, or 
decision-making, when we do not yet understand the neural activity 
that causes consciousness, much less any free-will consciousness. Study 
of the topography of oscillatory synchronization currently holds the 
most promise for identifying neural activity that causes consciousness. 
Once that is accomplished, we should be in a better position to use 
those objective measures to identify what is free will and what is not.
Almost certainly, free will emerges from a distributed process in 
neocortex, which provides the substrate for consciousness itself. One 
might monitor multiple neuronal activities within appropriate corti-
cal columns. For example, if the willed task involves vision, multiple 
columns in visual cortex should be monitored. Perhaps changes in 
impulse onset/offset, firing rate, change in firing rate, or sequential 
interval patterns will be seen in certain neurons. Perhaps there will be 
changes in oscillatory frequencies of field potentials or in coherences 
with oscillations elsewhere or with other frequencies.
I suggest that there might be a global electrical marker for con-
scious decision making: synchronization of brain-wave oscillations at 
multiple locations. Degree of synchronization can be frequency spe-
cific, involving shifts in coherence among various brain areas and even 
among oscillators of different frequency. In my laboratory, we noticed 
that when subjects made a conscious decision about which mental 
images were present in an ambiguous figure, there was significantly 
increased synchronization in specific frequency bands across widely 
distributed scalp locations (Klemm, Li, & Hernandez, 2000). 
Note the advantage of the ambiguous-figure paradigm. The physi-
cal stimulus on the retina can remain the same, while one alternative 
image is held in conscious awareness and at the same time the alterna-
tive image is held subconsciously. Moreover, an experienced subject 
can choose which image to hold consciously and which to suppress. 
Subjects can also control how long they hold a given percept. We 
used wavelet analysis, which allows one to track frequency changes 
as a function of short epochs of time, which is not feasible with con-
ventional spectral analysis. We also found, much to our surprise, that 
synchronization occurred in multiple frequency bands, a finding that 
has also been reported by others (Makeig, Jung, & Sejnowski, 1998).   
For example, in a study of selective visual attention, multiple coherent 
EEG oscillatory components were observed to be differentially modu-
lated by specific conscious events. It is also possible that a marker for 
conscious will action is the sudden synchronization of two or more 
oscillation frequencies with each other. 
Whenever a person switches percept in an ambiguous figure stimu-
lus from one alternative to the other, some aspect of cortical signals 
synchronizes. The obvious interpretation is that this is a correlate of 
conscious perception. But it is also a correlate of decision making; 
that is, we decide whether we are seeing a vase or a face. Subjects 
can, through force of will, choose which percept to hold in working 
memory. In fact, for many such images, many subjects have to extend 
considerable mental effort to perceive one alternative image because 
their default percept is so strong. Since oscillatory synchronization is 
so tightly associated with this process, this may be the clue that free 
will is enabled by synchronization of certain oscillations. An experi-
ment could readily check for changes in coherence patterns when one 
freely wills to hold the difficult percept in consciousness as compared 
with patterns during the default percept. This does not prove there is 
no preceding subconscious EEG correlate, but the experiment might 
benefit from including a time indicator, of the Libet or Soon type, for 
when subjects realized they wanted to force perception of the difficult 
alternative image. If synchronization changes indicative of intent occur 
before the indication of conscious intent, it might support the zombian 
hypothesis. However, we would still face many of the faulty assump-
tions mentioned earlier (intent processes are smeared in time, extra 
time is needed for realization of intent vs. generation of intent, etc.).
A  step  in  the  right  experimental  direction  is  the  experiment 
reported  by  Daeyeol  Lee  (2004)  at  the  University  of  Rochester. 
He  monitored  the  level  of  coherent  oscillations  in  electrical  activ-
ity in the supplemental cortex of monkeys in a task in which they 
made  a  predictable  series  of  hand  movements  as  they  integrated 
sensory signals with expected reward. Movement performance was 
influenced  by  both  the  position  of  movement  and  the  location  of 
the rewarded target, but only the expected reward affected the de-
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http://www.ac-psych.org 2010 • volume 6 • 47-65 63
things consciously, but coherence of neuronal activity clearly seems 
to  be  a  marker  of  something  different  from  the  amount  of  acti-
vity.
Another useful illustration of the value of EEG synchronization 
is found in the work of Melloni et al. (2007). The neural signals that 
differentiate unconscious and conscious thinking might be found in 
oscillatory synchrony of brain field potentials. In one test of such a 
possibility, subjects were evaluated while processing visible and invis-
ible words in a delayed matching to sample task. Both perceived and 
nonperceived words caused a similar increase of local gamma oscilla-
tions in the EEG, but only perceived words were associated with tran-
sient synchronization of gamma oscillations across widely separated 
regions  of  the  brain  (Melloni  et  al.,  2007).  This  parallels  our  own 
observation  that  sudden  synchronization  appeared  at  the  instant 
when subjects viewing an ambiguous figure suddenly perceived the 
alternative image that had been previously inaccessible to conscious-
ness.
Physiological correlates of presumed free will might benefit from 
testing under multiple-choice conditions. This overcomes many of the 
simplistic assumptions in dichotomous two-step designs that com-
pares a free-will possibility with a no-free will baseline. It also would 
allow an experimenter to manipulate comparative strengths of choice 
options. 
  To summarize, I think this critique shows enough weaknesses in 
the zombian theory to warrant a new generation of experiments aimed 
at  testing  the  possibility  that  there  is  neural  representation  of  free
will.
CONClUDINg phIlOsOphICal             
peRspeCTIve
Commonly, we think of neural events as causing bodily movement as 
well as consciousness, and assume from zombian research that con-
sciousness cannot cause neural events. This view treats consciousness 
as some kind of ethereal, out-of-brain, non-physical entity. But sup-
pose that consciousness itself is a neural event! In that case, conscious 
intent would have a physical reality in the brain and would of course be 
able to influence other neural activity. Our current inability to describe 
consciousness in neurophysiological terms does not mean that this 
possibility is not accessible. In another paper, I attempt to describe a 
new way to think about and test conscious functions in neurophysi-
ological terms.
Finally, let us recognize the built-in bias in free-will research, which 
is typically rooted in materialistic determinism. Experiments are often 
designed to falsify the free-will hypothesis. Dennett (2003) provides 
the philosophical argument that determinism and free will can be 
compatible.
The origin of intents, choices, and decisions may well arise through 
either subconscious or conscious mechanisms. In the unified mind 
of embodied brain, all major acts of will may involve cooperative en-
gagement of both subconscious and conscious minds in the genesis of 
zombian or free will, or some combination of both. The required neu-
ral “machinery” will depend on the nature of willed actions. Simple, 
well-learned, or habitual tasks, can be a zombian process. Complex 
or novel tasks may require free-will operation of the conscious mind. 
Both minds interact and inform each other to varying degrees of what 
each is doing. Each can guide and influence the actions of the other. In 
the case of conscious mind, the feedback to subconscious operations 
also serves a programming function. Providing such programming can 
even be a free-will intention.
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